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Confessions of an ethics committee chair
Christine Halse*
School of Education, Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia
This essay examines the possibilities of being/becoming an ethical
researcher in the academy. It tackles this task through the lens of an
ethics application by Mary [pseudonym], a PhD student in sociology whose
research thesis was investigating the reasons why married men with
children use prostitutes. Two analyses are offered of Mary’s story. The first
analysis presents the sort of critique that a university ethics committee
might make of Mary’s ethics application and uses the principles that are the
basis of regulatory research ethics frameworks around the world. From this
starting point, the second analysis examines how the problems that an
ethics committee would see in Mary’s proposal might have come about. By
way of explanation, I posit that an ethics of rational self-interest has
asserted itself as a new moral economy among students, doctoral
supervisors and within the management of universities. The co-existence
of these two irreconcilable discourses of ethics – principlism and rational
self-interest – has implications for being/becoming an ethical researcher and
for the work of research ethics committees in the academy.
Keywords: ethics; doctorate; discourse; moral economy; rational self
interest
Introduction
To date, my writing on research ethics has focused on the disconnection between
university ethics review and the ‘real world’ of research practice, the (unethical)
intrusion of the practices and technologies of ethics review in the research enterprise,
and the ways in which these construct an institutional discourse of ethical research
that can undermine the explicit purpose of research ethics policy of summoning into
being ethical research and researchers (Halse and Honey 2005, 2007). In this essay,
I shift the gaze from the procedural, bureaucratic effects of regulatory ethics to a more
difficult problem. Here, my interest is to interrogate the possibilities of being in the
academy and being an ethical researcher within an ethics of principlism – the universal
code that defines ethical research practice in the contemporary university. Principlism
is the basis of the regulatory ethics frameworks in Australia, Canada, the United
Kingdom (UK), the United States of America (USA), and elsewhere, and drives the
decision-making of university ethics committees and institutional review boards
whose approval is required before students and academics can undertake research.
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This essay is also a confession. Not a confession in a biblical sense of the
injunction to ‘confess faults one to another, and pray one for another that ye may be
healed’ (James 5:16). This requires a declaration of wrong-doing – some sinful,
undisclosed deed – whereby forgiveness becomes possible only through the spoken
act of confession. Rather, this essay is a reflexive analysis in the Foucauldian sense of
making public knowledge that is hidden – silenced, suppressed, or secreted away –
and that can only be known through the labour of confession. The act of confession,
Foucault proposes, requires both the questioner and the questioned. The questions
I attend to here emanate from the multiple critiques that have challenged
the practices and institutional discourses of research ethics review, but in this
essay I take up the roles of both questioner and questioned as a technology of self
and as a reflexive mode of self-discipline. As a chair of a university ethics committee,
it strikes me that such disciplining is integral to the intellectual work of an ethics
committee which has responsibilities to an institution as well as to researchers and
research subjects, and the interests of these different groups do not always
comfortably align.
Ten years of chairing a university ethics committee, I confess, have left me
ambivalent about the possibility of ethical research in/by the academy. To explain
how and why this ambivalence has come about, I make use of a paradigmatic
example: a narrative account entitled Mary’s story that is based on a ‘real life’ ethics
application of a PhD student. While key features of the narrative have been changed
to protect the identity of individuals, Mary’s story illustrates some of the typical
issues that arise in the preparation and conduct of scholarly, academic research in
universities. Mary’s story is part of a larger collection of similar exemplar cases that
are used as a pedagogical strategy in research ethics training classes in Australian
universities to walk research students and academics through the national ethics
framework and the principles that ought to guide ethical decision-making and action
in their research practice.
The article begins by examining Mary’s story in a regulatory framework of
principlism and discusses the typical sorts of issues that an ethics committee might
raise in considering Mary’s research proposal. My aim, however, is to move beyond
the limitations of such critiques by interrogating what the issues likely to be raised
during ethics committee review suggest about the nature of responsibility and
conditions of possibility for doing/being a principled researcher in the contemporary
university.
This article is structured in five sections. The first of these is entitledMary’s story
and introduces Mary – our paradigmatic PhD student – and the PhD project she
presented to the university ethics committee for review and approval. The second
section, Principlism as an ethical framework and disciplining practice, describes the
principles that are the basis of ethics regulations in Australia, where Mary is
enrolled, and in similar countries, and provides an overview of the historical
development of an ethics of principlism. It highlights the distinction between an
ethical framework of principlism and the purpose of research ethics committees as a
disciplinary system designed to control and normalize researcher behaviour and
practice. The third section, Mary’s story in a regulatory framework of principlism,
examines Mary’s research proposal using the national principles that regulate
research ethics in Australia but posits a tricky and more complex question that lies
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beyond the narrow scope of principlism and the remit of ethics committees review.
Namely, how and why did the difficulties in Mary’s research proposal come to be?
This is the question addressed in the fourth section: The question of responsibility and
rational self-interest. Following a discussion of the concept of responsibility inherent
in Mary’s research proposal and drawing on the philosophies of Sigwick and Rand, I
propose that rational egoism or rational self-interest has become a key driver of
agency and decision-making in the contemporary university. This state of affairs,
I argue in the final section Conclusion, does not prohibit an ethics of principlism or
compliance with a regulatory ethics framework, but it does create two competing
irreconcilable institutional discourses of ethics. These constrain the possibility of
being/becoming an ‘ethical’ researcher in the academy but also open up the
possibility of a new moral purpose for research ethics committees.
Mary’s story
Mary was a mature age PhD student in sociology. She missed out on winning a
scholarship so was self-funding her studies. As a recently divorced, single mother with
two high school-aged children, enrolling in a full-time PhD was a significant financial
struggle, but her supervisor had encouraged Mary to enrol. He had told her that she had
a strong, important research proposal and was ‘guaranteed’ to get a scholarship in the
next round, and that he was excited about supervising her. He did not tell her that she
would be his first PhD student and Mary did not think to ask. She enjoyed the
undergraduate subject she did with him and was buoyed by his interest in her and her
research question: Why do married men with children use prostitutes?
Mary had a vested, personal interest in this research question. She attributed the
breakdown of her marriage and subsequent divorce to the discovery that her husband of
18 years regularly visited a city brothel. Mary had discussed the personal motivations
driving her research interest with her supervisor. He endorsed her research project as a
valuable step in Mary’s recovery from a traumatic life experience.
Six months into her candidature, Mary submitted her ethics application to the
university ethics committee for review and approval. The synopsis stated:
This study examines why married men with children use prostitutes. Married men with
children have access to a sexual partner so the question of why this group use
prostitutes is particularly interesting. This is a qualitative study. Information will be
collected by surveying married men with children who use prostitutes. Data will be
collected by approaching men accompanied by a wife and their children at my local
shopping centre on Saturday morning and asking them to complete a verbal survey
about why they use prostitutes. Data will not be published but will produce generalisable
answers to the research question and be used in my thesis, entitled ‘‘Sex and the not-
so-single man’’.
The university ethics committee reviewed Mary’s ethics application and, after
extended discussion, decided her study was not ready to progress. The ethics committee
sent Mary and her supervisor a detailed letter outlining the areas that it argued needed
to be addressed before her research proposal met the ethical principles laid out in the
National Statement on Human Research Ethics (2007). It urged Mary to resubmit her
application after consultation with her supervisor and further development.
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Principlism as an ethical framework and disciplining practice
In Australia, as elsewhere, the conduct of research is governed by national guidelines
that utilize an ethics of normative principles as a practical approach for
ethical decision-making. Australia’s National Statement on Human Research
Ethics (2007), for example, asks researchers to frame their research in consideration
of four principles:
. Research merit and integrity: that the research is based on a thorough study
of previous studies and the current literature; employs a rigorous research
design and appropriate methods and contributes to knowledge and
understanding in the discipline or field.
. Justice: that the benefits and burdens of research are distributed fairly.
. Beneficence: that the likely benefits of the research justify any risks of harm
or discomfort to participants, including psychological harms, such as
feelings of worthlessness, distress, guilt, anger, or fear related, for example,
to disclosure of sensitive or embarrassing information; devaluation of
personal worth: including being humiliated, manipulated or in other ways
treated disrespectfully or unjustly; or social harms, including damage to
social networks or relationships with others.
. Respect: that the researcher respects the privacy, confidentiality and cultural
sensitivities of participants and, where relevant, their communities.
As with other national ethics guidelines, an ethical framework of principlism is
not based on a single, coherent ethical theory but a set of practical principles that
draw on an amalgam of philosophical perspectives: Kant (autonomy); Rawls
(justice); Mills (beneficence); and Gert (nonmaleficence). Within a framework of
principlism, moral agency is derived from socially agreed norms which assume that:
the experiences of the dominant social group can be generalized and taken as true for all
others [and that] all rational subjects will acknowledge that the agreed universal moral
principles are in the interests of all subjects (Halse and Honey 2005, 2152).
Thus, the ideal moral agent of principlism is a rational being who abides by the
decreed universalized norms of principlism even when this involves acting in ways
that are counter to his or her subjective desires or rational self-interest.
The coalescence of principlism into regulatory frameworks for the ethical
conduct of research evolved from the exposure of the Nazis’ human experiments
during the Nuremburg war crime trials and other scientific and medical research
studies that turned a blind eye to the rights and dignity of human subjects. One of the
most high profile cases was the Tuskegee syphilis study which was conducted
between 1932 and 1972 by the Public Health Service in Alabama, USA, and involved
399 African-American sharecroppers who were injected with syphilis without their
consent and subsequently deprived of treatment (Jones 1981). There were also non-
therapeutic experiments such as the Vanderbilt Nutrition Study where 711 pregnant
women attending the Vanderbilt University Hospital Prenatal Clinic were enrolled in
a radioactive iron experiment without their knowledge or consent, and administered
a cocktail containing a radioactive isotope that caused bruising, loss of teeth, cancer,
and a statistically significant higher incidence of cancer among their offspring
(Hagestrom et al. 1969). Other cases included the Total Body Irradiation Study at
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the University of Cincinnati, conducted from 1960 to 1972 and funded by the
Defense Atomic Support Agency. This involved administering increasing doses of
radioactivity to elderly, poor, or cognitively impaired individuals without telling
them about the risks involved and which led to the deaths of at least eight
participants (Welsome 1999). Similar experiments ignoring the principle of informed
consent were conducted by the US Atomic Energy Commission on prison inmates in
Utah, Colorado, California, Pennsylvania, Illinois and Oklahoma (Advisory
Committee on Human Radiation Experiences 1995).
Such cases attracted particular notoriety but the USA has not been alone in
sacrificing the ethical treatment of human subjects to the interests of scientific and
medical research. In the UK, for example, the Alder Hey Organ Retention case
involved the removal and retention for future research of tissue and body parts from
hundreds of foetuses and children who died during treatment without the
authorization or knowledge of the children’s parents (Redfern 2001).
Social science researchers have also ignored the rights and interests of research
subjects. Social psychologist Stanley Milgram, for instance, conducted obedience
experiments at Yale University during the 1960s that used deception to test the
distress levels experienced by participants who believed they were inflicting pain on
other research subjects (Cave and Holm 2003). Between 1965 and 1968, sociologist
and ordained Episcopal minister, Laud Humphrey, represented himself as a voyeur
in order to observe and record men involved in anonymous homosexual sex in public
toilets but did not tell the men that he was also collecting data for his PhD.
Humphrey subsequently procured the home addresses of many of the men through
the Department of Motor Vehicles, visited them in disguise and obtained
confidential information about their health, marital status and sexual behaviours
by purporting to collect information for a health service (Humphreys 1970).
More subtle ethical issues have arisen in social science research when research
participants have contended that researchers ‘got the story wrong’, as in the case of
Margaret Mead’s Coming of age in Samoa, William Foote Whyte’s Street Corner
Society (Johnson 2002), Bronislaw Malinowsky ethnography, Argonauts (Erickson
1996), or when researchers used privacy standards that were inappropriate for
participants, as Caroline Ellis discovered with her ethnography of fishing villages
near Chesapeake Bay (Johnson 2002).
Progressive exposure of such ethical practices – often funded by government
agencies and conducted in prestigious universities – led to stronger regulation of
research involving human subjects. The foundation was set by the Nuremburg Code
(1947) and Helsinki Declaration (1964). In the USA, the National Commission for
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1974–
1978) was established following the Tuskegee Syphilis scandal. One of the
Commission’s key initiatives was the Belmont Report (1978) which established
respect, beneficence and justice as overarching principles for ethical decision-making
in human subject research. In 1991, the principles of the Belmont Report were
extended into a uniform set of regulations called the Federal Policy for the
Protection of Human Subjects or ‘Common Rule’ to regulate the conduct of research
in the USA. Australia, Canada and other nations also progressively adopted
principlism as a practical ethical approach and decision-making tool for regulating,
monitoring and governing research with humans.
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In broad terms, researchers have accepted the idea of justice, beneficence, respect,
and research merit and integrity as a workable set of principles for guiding ethical
decision-making but there has been strong – sometimes vehement – criticism of the
mandatory regulation of research by ethics committees and the ways in which the
operations, interpretations and decisions of ethics committees impinge on academic
work and research in universities (Cannella and Lincoln 2007). Among the
accusations levelled at university ethics committees is that they have progressively
expanded their activities and purview by imposing unnecessary prescription, excessive
regimentation and exaggerated precautions to protect universities and other organi-
zations from litigation and lawsuits (Gunsalus et al. 2007; Sikes and Piper 2010).
There is legitimacy to such criticisms. After all, there is an important conceptual
distinction between principlism as an ethical framework and the purposes of an
ethics committee review of research. Ethics review is a disciplinary system: a regime
of power designed to control researchers by compelling them to conduct their
research according to the norms, practices and protocols of principlism approved by
institutional, state and/or national guidelines. In this disciplinary system, researchers
are required to publicly demonstrate their subjectification to the norms of
principlism through the public performance of completing their ethics applications
in the correct, disciplined and approved way. Like other contemporary disciplinary
systems, the concern of ethics review is not with what researchers do but with what
they have not done. That is, the ways in which researchers fail to meet the required,
normative standards of behaviour demanded by the ethics committee’s interpretation
of the normative ethical principles.
The tactics and technologies of disciplinary systems are not shaped by a universal
moral script or pre-ordained notion of good/bad or right/wrong. Rather, the purpose
of ethics review as a disciplinary system is to impose specific performative demands
that discipline researchers and correct deviant behaviour, so that the researchers
conduct themselves according to sanctioned standards. It is by deploying technologies
of power to enforce the principles of regulatory ethics frameworks and the authority
of ethics committee that the processes of human research ethics review establish
particular truths and knowledges about what constitutes rigorous and ethical
research.
Research students acquire the expertise to develop a research proposal and to
give account of their expertise in the performative process of ethics review through
immersion, habituation and subjectification to the code of conduct in their academic
discipline. Thus, the act of submitting an ethics application for ethics review is also a
process for eliciting and establishing particular truths and knowledge about
applicants, in particular, students’ compliance with the normative principles of
research in their discipline/field, including their knowledge and competence in using
relevant literature, theory, and designing, collecting and analysing research data in
ways that are compliant with the normative principles of ethical research. The aim of
research ethics review, therefore, is to prevent and control potentially deviant
behaviour by requiring applicants to refine, revise and correct their ethics application
until their performance meets normative standards. For doctoral students, this is the
procedure through which the undisciplined research student becomes recognized and
recognizable as a disciplined neophyte scholar who has mastered the basics of
conducting research in the ethically approved way.
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Mary’s story in a regulatory framework of principlism
For an ethics committee operating through the lens of the four principles of
Australia’s National Framework for Human Research Ethics, Mary’s research
proposal raises several problems. One concern relates to intellectual rigor, merit and
integrity. Mary’s study is based on a number of questionable assumptions and
insinuations. For example: that the use of prostitutes by a married man with children
is ‘bad’ and that a monogamous married relationship is ‘good’; that marriage and
children are important variables in the moral of economy of prostitution; that the use
of prostitutes by a married man with children is substantively different to the use of
prostitutes by married men without children or men in de facto relationships; and
that a man accompanied by a woman and children at the local shopping centre on a
Saturday morning can be presumed to be both husband and father, etc.
There is also a related question of how Mary’s study builds on and will add to
existing knowledge and understanding. The use of ‘prostitutes’ by ‘married men’ is a
familiar topic in the popular and academic literature. A Google Scholar search of
both terms will identify 7420 journal articles. Havelock Ellis, the British psychologist
and sexologist, traversed the question in his seven volume Study of the Psychology of
Sex, published between 1897 and 1928. Shifting the focus to the slightly broader
issue of extramarital sexual relations, research by Dr Holly Hein (2000), author of
Sexual Detours, indicates that two of every three marriages are affected by an
extramarital sexual relationship and that 70% of men and 60% of women have one
or more affairs during marriage. An internet search of the terms ‘extramarital’ and
‘affair’ will lead to a plethora of sites, where married individuals, despite ‘having
access to a sexual partner’, can procure extramarital sex: www.philanderers.com,
www.illicitencounters.com and www.discreetadventures.com.
Research merit and integrity also comes into play in relation to Mary’s expertise
and capacity in her proposed research methods: the (mis)description of a verbally
administered survey as qualitative research and the (incorrect) contention that data
from a random sample of unspecified size from a single shopping centre on a
Saturday morning can produce generalizable findings.
There are also issues related to respect and beneficence. Men and their families
might normally expect to be able to go shopping on Saturday without being
inconvenienced or having their privacy intruded upon by a researcher; and without
being confronted by questions that might cause embarrassment, anxiety or distress
by making men flustered and uncomfortable, be inappropriate in the presence of
others, particularly his spouse and children, or damage family relationships if those
present construe (rightly or wrongly) the man as responding to the researcher’s
questioning in a guilty manner. Another, more pragmatic concern is that shopping
centres are private property. Consequently, Mary would need the owners’ approval
to legally administer her survey on their property. Given the problems of respect and
beneficence in Mary’s research proposal, an ethics committee might be sceptical
about whether or not Mary could get her data collection approved by the shopping
centre’s owners.
None of these are unusual errors for a neophyte researcher. Nevertheless, for an
ethics committee they raise questions that need to be addressed in terms of the
quality and extent of Mary’s familiarity with the field, her training in research design
and methods, the expertise and oversight of her doctoral supervisor who should have
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picked up such difficulties, and whether at this stage of candidature Mary had the
knowledge, skills and support to conduct the research and to generate worthwhile
insights into why married men with children might use prostitutes.
The question of responsibility and rational self-interest
Internationally, there has been a trend towards greater monitoring, regulation and
control of doctoral students and doctoral education (Halse and Mowbray 2011). But
the very issues an ethics committee might see in Mary’s research proposal raise more
complex questions about the conditions of possibility for becoming/being an ethical
researcher in the academy. These are matters that are beyond the remit of an ethics
committee and which speak to a particular absence that continues to haunt the
preparation of doctoral students (Halse and Mowbray 2011). This absence concerns
questions of responsibility. It includes the responsibility of students to master the
literature, conventions and methods of their discipline or field, the responsibility of
supervisors to provide high-quality academic expertise, guidance and over-sight, and
the responsibility of universities to provide sufficient instruction and training to
ensure that students like Mary can satisfy the performative demands of their
discipline and the ethics committee.
Two forms of responsibility are pertinent in this case. Both involve a quasi-
judicial notion of responsibility: a prospective responsibility that is concerned with
what should be done, and retrospective responsibility that is concerned with aligning
duties or obligations (prospective responsibilities) to individuals in order to attribute
blame and liability, and hold individuals to account when they are neglectful in the
performance of their duties. The aim of this essay is not to debate the philosophical
complexities of prospective and retrospective responsibility. Theorists have already
tackled this task by elucidating the complexities, varieties and relationship between
both forms of responsibility (Jonas 1984; Birnbacher 2001) and their implications for
subjectivity and agency (Ricoeur 1992). Rather, my purpose is to make an
educational argument about the imperative for a broader moral concept of
responsibility in the relationship between student/supervisor/university.
The absence of responsibility implicit in Mary’s ethics application speaks of an
absence of commitment and responsibility to the ‘learning alliance’ by all those
involved in prematurely progressing Mary’s research proposal to ethics review:
Mary, her supervisor and the university. The concept of the ‘learning alliance’ is akin
to the ‘therapeutic alliance’ between clinician and patient to work together on the
patient’s recovery. In an educational context, the ‘learning alliance’ is the tacit,
mutual obligation and commitment between research students and their supervisors
and university to work together in the joint project of productively fostering
students’ learning and research; for a fuller discussion, see Halse and Malfroy (2010).
The concept of the learning alliance is at the spiritual heart of research education and
the liberal university. It is a concept that articulates the moral grammar of
responsibility within universities as including responsibility for one’s own actions,
both in the past and in the future, and responsibility for other people and things. It is
this double notion of responsibility that is captured in Ricoeur’s (1992) reminder that
‘one is responsible for others’ (20) and that is essential to Levinas’ ‘first philosophy’
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of the intersubjective relation viz., ‘a nonvolitional response to, and ongoing
responsibility for, the alterity of the ‘‘other’’’ (Levinas 1991, 110–118).
What conditions in universities have allowed the erosion of responsibility to the
learning alliance to come into being? A second thread in Mary’s story offers an entry
point for considering this question. It concerns the role of the personal in the
conduct of social science research. A researcher’s beliefs, values, expertise and
experiences – subjectivities, identities and biographies – play an important and
sometimes pivotal part in shaping a researcher’s choice of research topic, modes of
engagement, research approaches and methods. They can also be a valuable and
productive tool for research and writing, as in the use of personal experience in self-
studies or auto-ethnography. Such personal involvement in social science research is
substantively and qualitatively different from cases where the research is a
stratagem for meeting personal rather than intellectual agendas, such as revenge,
self-exoneration, personal aggrandisement, etc.
Mary’s story reveals the relationship between her research interests and the
breakdown of her marriage and, in doing so, prompts questions about her personal
motivations and purposes: the extent to which she is committed to pursuing her topic
in a spirit of open enquiry, to being receptive to findings that might be contrary to
her personal views or experiences, and using her personal past in ways that
productively generate new scholarly and social insights.
Mary’s story also raises questions about the supervisor’s agendas. As a young,
new academic, he has strong personal motivations for encouraging Mary to enrol in
a PhD without a scholarship despite knowing she would experience financial
hardship and for encouraging Mary to see her research as a valuable therapeutic
intervention despite lacking any qualifications to make such a recommendation.
Enrolling a PhD student brings supervisors significant personal and professional
rewards by reducing their undergraduate teaching workload and advancing their
career because doctoral supervision is a key criterion for progression and promotion
through the hierarchy of academe (Halse 2011).
Mary’s story also raises questions about the interests and role of the
university. Typical of many Australian universities, there are strong incentives for
universities to encourage the enrolment of PhD students: increasing enrolments
attracts additional funding and enhances a university’s national and international
standing. There are also strong motives for a university to be tardy in ensuring
that research students have the necessary instruction and research training
required to meet the normative standards demanded by their discipline and an
ethics committee. Like all other universities, it was strapped for cash and budget
expenditure needed to be prioritized. Under such conditions, research training for
doctoral students can easily be rationalized as a task to be tackled in
future years.
An alternative interpretation is that the motives and actions of each of these
parties are the consequence of inexperience, naivety or administrative ineptitude.
Such an interpretation, however, requires us to forsake the notions of capacity for
conscious decision-making, agency and responsibility. Nevertheless, the motives and
actions of Mary, her supervisor and university, were logical, rational and grounded –
they were grounded in the pragmatic realities of their personal histories, contexts and
priorities. An alternative analysis, therefore, is that the actions of each party – either
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knowingly or intuitively – privileged their different, personal and specific self-
interests over the interests of others or broader academic agendas. Such an analysis
involves the protagonists inMary’s story in the deployment of a consequential ethics
of ‘rational egoism’ or ‘rational self-interest’.
The guiding principle of rational self-interest is that all action is based on a
rational concern for maximizing personal self-interest. The philosophy of rational
self-interest originated in the work of nineteenth-century English philosopher Henry
Sigwick (1874, 95) who argued that:
an agent regards quantity of consequent pleasure and pain to himself alone important in
choosing between alternatives of action; and seeks always the greatest attainable surplus
of pleasure over pain.
Sigwick’s ideas were developed, amongst others, by Ayn Rand (1964) who was a
key advocate of objectivist ethics and who coined the phrase ‘rational self-interest’.
The essence of Rand’s argument was that: ‘The actor must always be the beneficiary
of his action and that man must act for his own rational self-interest’ (81) and that it
was irrational and immoral to act against one’s self-interest:
The moral purpose of a man’s life is the achievement of his own happiness. This does
not mean that he is indifferent to all men, that human life is of no value to him and that
he has no reason to help others in an emergency. But it does mean that he does not
subordinate his life to the welfare of others, that he does not sacrifice himself to their
needs, that the relief of their suffering is not his primary concern, that any help he gives
is an exception, not a rule, an act of generosity, not of moral duty, that it is marginal
and incidental. (Rand 1964, 49)
Theorists emphasize that rational egoism or self-interest is not a license to do as
one pleases in the absence of an objective, rational reason. Nor does it mean that all
rational judgements and their consequent actions are immoral. Rather, rational self-
interest is a normative ethics which contends that only the promotion of self-interest
guided by rules of reason can be moral, and that any betterment for others or
generally is incidental and secondary. As Baier (1993, 197) explained, this is not
egoism in the sense of being ‘self-centred, inconsiderate, unfeeling, unprincipled,
ruthless self-aggrandizers, pursuers of the good things in life whatever the cost to
others, people who think only about themselves or, if about other, then merely as a
means to their own ends’. Rational egoism maintains that ‘it is always rational (wise,
reasonable, reason-backed), always right (moral, praiseworthy, virtuous), to aim at
one’s own greatest good, and never rational etc., never right etc., not to do so’ (210).
Rational self-interest is the antithesis of the principlism of regulatory ethics codes
where the concern for the welfare of ‘others’ in the research (e.g. research subjects) is
superordinate to the interests of all others, including the researcher. Rational egoism
and rational self-interest are not without their philosophical and moral critics (Parfit
1984). Nevertheless, the deployment of rational action to satisfy their personal
agendas and respective self-interests offers an explanation of the apparent respon-
sibility by the agents in Mary’s story and their apparent absence of responsibility to
other agents or broader academic agendas.
What makes the concept of rational self-interest a particularly persuasive
theoretical explanation for the problems inherent in Mary’s story is that self-interest
has become a defining feature of the moral economy of universities under neo-
liberalism and new public management. Neo-liberal ideology is premised on a faith
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in economic rationalism, utility, the valorization of individual responsibility, and the
implementation of the organizational practices and cultures of new public manage-
ment that privilege performance, competition, audit and accountability (Rose 1999;
Olssen and Peters 2005). The infiltration of these ideologies into universities has
stimulated discussion among scholars around the world (Marginson and Considine
2000; Marginson 2007; Peters 2007; Meek, Teichler, and Kearney 2009).
Their shared concern has been with the intellectual, structural and operational
effects of neoliberalism and new public management, and the ways in which these
have worked their way into daily practices of universities and reshaped academic
work: permeating the management and funding of universities, research and doctoral
programs and changing university policies, procedures and practices, including the
criteria for academic appointments, promotions, workloads, salaries, and institu-
tional recognition of ‘quality’ performance in teaching and research.
These changed cultural conditions have been accomplished through disciplinary
technologies which carry rewards and punishments (either actual or insinuated) that
nurture a moral economy of rational self-interest. In this regime, prioritizing one’s
own self-interest not only makes sense – it is the rational choice. Further, the returns
of acting in one’s own self-interest outweigh the benefits of other ethical approaches
as the only guaranteed route for achieving the status, rewards and success within and
for universities. In this respect, rational self-interest might be considered a
technology of optimization – a strategy for maximizing the returns of the prevailing
social cultural and political conditions in universities – and a form of ethnopolitics
that ‘attempts to shape the conduct of human beings by acting upon their sentiments,
beliefs, and values – in short, by acting on ethics’ (Rose 2007, 27).
Conclusion
The principlism of regulatory research ethics frameworks cannot provide an
exhaustive, unambiguous set of rules to define and shape the responsibilities of
moral agents. As Derrida (1995) reminds us, to demand such a rule, guarantee or
subjective certainty as a precondition for recognizing responsibility substitutes
technique for responsibility and subsumes the individual case to the generality of a
given law that ‘manages to irresponsibilize our decisions and our singular
responsibility for them’ (82).
A distinguishing feature of rational self-interest is that it over-rides the very
notion of the singular responsibility to others that is at the heart of an ethics of
principlism. Further, the co-existence of rational self-interest and an ethics of
principlism mean that there are two competing and opposing discourses of ethics at
play within universities. When the institutional culture of rational egoism is so
pervasive and entrenched that it constructs its own moral economy, it erases the
possibilities of being in the academy and being an ethical researcher within the ethics
of principlism.
It is in the tensions arising from the irreconcilable philosophical conflict of these
opposing institutional discourses that my ambivalence about the possibility of being/
becoming an ‘ethical’ researcher in the academy lies. I confess that this is a
pessimistic picture and, of course, Mary’s story is a ‘fictional’ account. A moral
economy of rational self-interest by students, supervisors and universities does not
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prohibit morality or categorically exclude compliance within a regulatory framework
based on an ethics of principlism. Nor should we presume that self-interest is the sole
driver of all moral actions within/by universities or abandon the possibility that
something more than self-interest will shape behaviour in/by universities in the
future. Certainly, there is hope that this may happen in the swelling call for
universities to refocus on the public good rather than individual benefits, particularly
in relation to doctoral education (Council of Graduate Schools 2008). Perhaps in the
ambivalence arising from the clash of these opposing ethical discourses, there is a
heightened moral role for research ethics committees. Not as a coercive technology
for disciplining researchers but as a moral beacon for those occasions when rational
self-interest causes students, academics and universities to fumble or neglect their
responsibilities to others.
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